

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Research and Publication, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest is included.

Publications of the Department, cumulative lists of which are published at the end of each quarter, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.

American Policy in Occupied Areas

Article by ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILLDRING

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE is responsible for the development and promulgation of American policy with respect to occupied areas. The War and Navy Departments are responsible for the execution of the over-all policy as formulated by the Department of State. The term *occupied areas* includes Germany, Austria, Japan, Korea, and the Venèzia Giulia area of Italy; and the term *American policy* applies to all policy which requires concerted study, consideration, or coordination by the State, War, and Navy Departments.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas is charged by the Secretary of State with coordinating all Departmental policy for occupied enemy territories. In accordance with the purpose of the establishment of this office, we are not makers of policy, but coordinators and expeditors of Departmental policy. The political, economic, and cultural questions concerning the occupied areas are still just as much the problems of the same divisions in the Department as they have always been. The advent of this new office has made no changes in their functions. This office coordinates the activities of all divisions that deal with occupied territories and directs their activities toward a common objective. Our purpose is simply to siphon off a coordinated policy in time for it to be useful and to leave the policy functions undisturbed. The need for such a point of contact from which the armed services might get policy decisions and get them *on time* has existed for the past three years. Unless the occupied areas are represented by a single unit in the State Department, it will never be possible for the Department to exercise leadership in this important field. Since 70-85 percent of the occupation problems presented to the State, War, and Navy Departments are political, the Department of State should occupy the position of leadership.

The machinery for the coordination of Departmental policy dealing with the occupied areas in Europe and in the Far East is provided through two State Department Secretariats, which are responsible to me for producing on time the Department's policy regarding the respective areas: the Germany-Austria Secretariat, presided over by James W. Riddleberger, Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs; and the Japan-Korea Secretariat, presided over by John C. Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Each Secretariat includes membership from the Offices of the Department concerned with occupation affairs, whether political, economic, or cultural.

Some sort of device is essential for coordinating the State Department's political functions and the service departments' administrative functions. That device is "SWNCC", the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, of which I am Chairman. SWNCC was created in December 1944 as a very active committee which provided a much-needed working link between the armed services and those responsible for foreign policy, and its existence until the end of hostilities was classified as confidential. Secretary Byrnes' directive of April 8, 1946 provided that I should be the State Department member of the Committee on all matters of occupation policy and should take the initiative in submitting to SWNCC such policy matters as may require concerted study, consideration, or action.¹

There is a need for coordination of many matters of policy which are not worthy of detailed con-

¹ For article on SWNCC see BULLETIN of Nov. 11, 1945, p. 745, and for text of the Secretary of State's directive, see BULLETIN of Apr. 28, 1946, p. 734. James C. Dunn is Chairman of SWNCC for matters not pertaining to occupied areas; H. Freeman Matthews is Acting Chairman in Mr. Dunn's absence.

sideration by the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy in person. That type of coordination is one of the functions of the SWNCC Directorate. To aid in coordinating the inter-agency aspects of occupied-areas policy, the SWNCC Directorate was created in April 1946.

Although the Department of State does not relinquish in any way or share the authority or responsibility for policy decisions in these matters, my office is responsible for enlisting the support of all civilian agencies of the Government which have an interest in and know-how concerning phases of the occupational program. Policy decisions, for instance, involving financial, food-supply, or industrial problems, profit from consultation with such departments as the Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce. Although at present there is no formal machinery for coordination of this nature, I am engaged in devising a procedure for obtaining the cooperation of other Federal agencies without putting the burden of policy responsibility on their shoulders.

One other agency involved in the occupation or government of occupied areas is the Far Eastern Commission, which was established in December 1945 at the Moscow Conference of the three Foreign Ministers. The Commission has authority to formulate the policies, principles, and standards in conformity with which the fulfilment by Japan of its obligations under the terms of surrender may be accomplished. In accordance with the policy

decisions of the Commission, the United States Government is charged with preparing directives and transmitting them to the Supreme Commander through the appropriate agency of the United States Government. The Supreme Commander is charged with the implementation of the directives which express the policy decisions of the Commission. Coordination between the United States Government and the Far Eastern Commission is a responsibility of the State Department. The American member and Chairman of the Commission is Major General Frank R. McCoy, and I am his alternate.

The office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas was created on April 8, 1946. The cooperation this office has received in the Department since that date has been superb. The best testimony of the success of our program is found in the fact that we have accomplished more in two months than had been planned for four months. Reports from the field indicate deep appreciation of the increased vigor which is being applied in Washington to the prompt solution of occupation problems. The Department of State is thus enabled to make a distinct contribution to military government at its roots and to attain a clearly recognized position of leadership with respect to the occupied areas.

[EDITOR'S NOTE: Two other articles on American policy in occupied areas will appear in later issues of the BULLETIN.]

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The Present Status of German Youth

Article by HENRY J. KELLERMANN

PART I

Statement of the Problem

RECENT APPEARANCES of resistance movements have again focused attention on the problem of German youth. Although the reported incidents are significant primarily from the point of view of long-range policy, they have strengthened the belief of students of the German problem that the re-education of German youth is a prerequisite to political recovery in general.

Re-education is generally understood as a systematic attempt at removing certain mental and moral weaknesses prevalent among German youth. Contemporary analyses suggest that German youth is characterized by a set of attitudes which may be either helpful or prejudicial, but thus far have been predominantly hurtful, to Allied-German efforts to establish democratic policies and procedures. German youth is depicted as being physically, mentally, and morally sick. Contaminated by the traces of a discredited (Nazi) ideology and indifferent to the standards of the Western tradition, German youth is further described as deeply distrustful of other philosophies and incapable of forming new allegiances.

Treatment of these weaknesses is allegedly made difficult by German youth's preoccupation with personal, often purely physical, needs, their tendency toward escapism, and their indifference toward all social standards, particularly in matters of property, sex, and work. German youth is said to lack moral initiative and to be unable to appreciate truth as a guide for human relations. Allowance is made for certain differentiations among young peoples depending on their home en-

An analysis and description of the problems of German youth after the collapse, the policies pursued by the several occupying powers in meeting these problems, and a survey of current conditions among youth organizations.

vironment, war experience, sex, and age. A youth editor of a South German paper, for instance, believes that the most difficult group includes those in the 20-25 age bracket, whose adolescent years were spent entirely under Nazi influence and who now seem encumbered with all the prejudices and resentments of a lost generation. He describes youth below age 17 as a more malleable group, anxious to learn and reform. Another factor complicating a balanced appraisal of the situation is the proportion of the sexes. It appears that the war has decimated the male population in the crucial age groups under 21. A recent census in Berlin revealed that among the 15,000 inhabitants of one particular district there were only 81 young men in the bracket of 16-21 years; in another district, the number of girls between the ages 18-21 was 717 as against 71 boys in the same age group.

All these analyses are limited, in that they fasten attention on symptoms rather than on causes. German youth today is the product of a number of circumstances. All of them have gone through the indoctrination system of the Hitler Youth and have received nothing to supplant this experience. As their nationalism is partly a legacy from the Nazi ideology, so their nihilism is largely the result of the break-down of the Nazi system. Political and moral excesses are attributable to a number of factors, some of which

Dr. Kellermann is a Research Analyst in the Division of Europe, Near East, and African Intelligence, Office of Research and Intelligence, Department of State. This study is partially based on observations made during a recent stay in Germany when Mr. Kellermann served as Chief of Research and Consultant to the Office of Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality.

were in existence before the break-down. Political extremism, which is a relatively minor problem at this point, may stem in part from organized efforts, planned prior to defeat, to continue resistance after the cessation of hostilities. But it may also directly reflect a general break-down of civic, social, and educational controls, which began long before the end of the war and only increased in extent after the collapse. The same cause can be held responsible for the progressive demoralization of German youth and for the rejection of all authority imposed by adult groups and institutions.

The prevailing social and economic conditions obviously contribute to the rise of waywardness, vagrancy, and delinquency. Outstanding among these conditions are the scarcity of foodstuffs, the housing shortage, and the resulting crowded living conditions, deterioration of family relations, and unemployment. Finally, political apathy and moral indolence are characteristic of young people who consider themselves outcasts or dissenters from society.

This indifference to political matters is likely to increase, if the authorities fail in their attempts to regain the confidence and the cooperation of youth. For, inasmuch as German youth is the product of a political system that failed, only the establishment of a better system will restore youth to a place in German society. The rehabilitation of German youth will depend on provisions made by the ruling groups to afford youth a chance for active participation in the process of reconstruction. The present state of political apathy or opposition on the part of German youth suggests either that a social order sufficiently attractive to enlist the majority of German youth does not exist, or that those who bid for the cooperation of youth have not yet succeeded in convincing German youth of the soundness of their program. In the light of these facts and so long as the attack is upon symptoms rather than causes, all efforts by Allied and German authorities to combat the rise in demoralization and delinquency are palliatives useful but of necessity limited in effect.

The following analysis of attitudes and trends in German youth and of Allied and German efforts to cope with the problem attempts to describe certain types of attitudes now prevalent and to examine various methods of treatment. Quantitative estimates as to the prevalence of these attitudes are

not possible at this time, but it is probable that extreme attitudes are shared by only a minority of youths. Although nationalistic trends are common, moreover, opposition and resistance to the Allied occupation are confined to a relatively small number of political activists. The overwhelming number of juveniles, even when tainted with remnants of Nazi thinking, are passive and usually still uninterested in and unresponsive to any approach by political groups. Those youths who take advantage of the present lack of adequate social and educational controls are more likely to engage in common offenses against public order than in subversive activities. However, it should be remembered that the scope of the problem remains variable. It is responsive to changes in the political and economic situation. If efforts to assure a subsistence economic level and to establish a workable political order should fail, demoralization and political radicalization of German youth toward the Right or Left may increase in direct proportion to the failure of the authorities in maintaining the appropriate controls.

General Attitudes and Trends

Nationalism and Nazi Residues

Of the political attitudes held by German youth, the most conspicuous is a reactionary type of nationalism. But although nationalism remains the most spectacular feature of their ideology, it is not always predominant nor does it assume the extreme, massive, and aggressive form of National Socialism. By comparison, the present nationalism of German youth is, in fact, much more complex and subtle than its predecessor. It springs from a number of sources of which Nazi indoctrination is only one. Other factors are the wartime intellectual isolation of Germany, the individual experiences of combat soldiers, and the conditions of defeat and occupation. For many youths nationalism is a purely negative form of political expression. To them it offers both a refuge and a platform from which to reject foreign and unfamiliar political ideologies. The presence of nationalism in these roles attests to the absence or to the inadequacy of efforts by the authorities and political parties to replace National Socialism with a new political creed. In other cases, nationalism appears as sublimized and takes the form of sabotage and organized crime.

The lingering effects of Nazism have produced in youth a state of social fossilization, i. e. a general inability to shake off the effects of Nazi teachings and to adapt themselves to the consequences of defeat and the exigencies of social change. Political thinking does not seem to have progressed much beyond the Nazi pattern. Allied observers have reported that large numbers of German young people, violently nationalistic in their feelings and outlook, continue to harbor sentiments of racial superiority, defend salient principles of Nazi doctrine, and insist on the sincerity of the original developers of the Nazi program. These same elements also reject the theory of collective guilt, attribute the origins of the war to a lack of *Lebensraum* (or to the Jews, the British, or the Poles), ascribe military defeat to treason, believe in a recurrence or future vindication of National Socialism, inveigh against the Soviet Union, and remain unsympathetic toward the victims of Nazism. A recent poll among 134 high-school students coming from upper- and middle-class families, taken by MG officers, revealed that more than half of them retained attitudes unmistakably Nazi or at least strongly nationalistic or chauvinistic.

Residues of Nazi thinking are particularly strong among students and returning veterans. Recent disturbances on German campuses have shown that a certain type of German student is highly sensitive to attacks on Nazi leadership or militarism, objects to a discussion of German war guilt, and vilifies those persons who admit German failure and guilt. Student sensibilities center on such problems as "national honor" and "student honor." Manifestations of nationalism are marked by threats of vengeance against liberals and by demands for a revival of *Feme* courts. This demand is a relapse into nationalistic tendencies which emerged after the last war, when the so-called Free Corps, founded by veterans, meted out punishment through *Feme* courts, whose prototype had first appeared in medieval times. The introduction of "Christian" principles into student activities is interpreted in a discriminatory sense, primarily to bar Marxist or other "materialist" elements.

Most of the arguments advanced by these students clearly derive from Nazi thought. In a number of instances, however, Nazi teachings are supplemented by the type of Free Corps (*Freikorps*) spirit which grows out of an inability to accept

military defeat as final. Returning veterans feel that their sacrifices at the front may remain unrecognized. As a compensation, they have initiated a cult of military virtues and have fanned the fires of revenge. In letters to newspapers, for example, veterans have denounced attempts to attribute human qualities to the enemy and have revived the charges of alleged atrocities committed by the other side.¹ Other individuals have revived the stab-in-the-back legend,² a traditional device of German nationalists to rationalize defeat. Occasionally, German defeat is blamed on the fact that the Germans were late in developing the atomic bomb; the delay is laid to the treason of German scientists.³

Nationalism, of course, receives new impetus from the fact that the Germans live under a military occupation. Inability to accept defeat is coupled with a resentment of the controls established by the occupying powers. The German reaction, however, assumes mostly an indirect form. In the absence of organized opposition, resistance takes the form of small-scale sabotage, civil disobedience, rumor-mongering, and the formation of small, secret groups to serve as the nuclei for future action. Resentment, furthermore, appears mainly to be leveled at secondary targets—German authorities and private individuals suspected of collaboration with occupying powers. Disaffection to Allied authorities, the primary target, is couched in cautious warnings that one must "respect" but not "love" them.⁴ Those persons who "idolize" the occupants are admonished not to deny their "Germanism" and to remember that "to remain a German, even in [the days of] our history's deepest humiliation, is the duty of each of us."⁵

In a more active phase, youthful gangs have engaged in smear campaigns against collaborationists, notably women, and formed so-called "barber clubs," i. e. gangs which specialize in cutting off the hair of German girls who fraternize with Al-

¹ *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Feb. 19, 1946.

² *Fuldaer Volkszeitung*, Feb. 13, 1946.

³ *Cf. Main Post* (Würzburg), Mar. 2, 1946, quoting contributions of school children on the subject, "Hitler and the War". Lurid accounts are frequently given of what would have happened to the Allies had Germany perfected the atomic bomb first.

⁴ *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Feb. 19, 1946, quoting the letter of a nationalist student.

⁵ *Ibid.*

lied soldiers; other gangs apparently have even plotted the assassination of leading personalities in public life through *Feme* courts.

Disagreement with Allied policies has, so far, not led to organized violence, but there has been much resentment over the handling of such matters as the distribution of food and de-Nazification. For instance, when asked by Allied officers to describe the difference between Allied de-Nazification and Nazi *Gleichschaltung*—the word refers to the National Socialist practice of removing from public and private positions “non-Aryans” and other persons considered undesirable to the regime and replacing them with supporters of Nazi policy—German youths have said that there are three chief distinctions:

1. Persons affected by *Gleichschaltung* retained their claims to pensions;
2. Such persons had the right to emigrate;
3. *Gleichschaltung* was a measure adopted by German authorities for German subjects and was not imposed by foreign powers.

Fundamentally, the contemptuous attitude toward Allied policies and procedures is based on a wide-spread tendency to see the present dilemma as the result of a victory undeserved by the Allies rather than as the consequence of a war caused and lost by Germany. This fact is particularly evident in the frequent objections made by students and veterans against submitting to the jurisdiction and verdicts of Allied courts. They characterize the Nürnberg trial as a manifestation of “the right of the victor” and do not consider it as an instrument for establishing international principles of law and order.⁶

The attitude of the more serious and perhaps more dangerous elements among the nationalist forces is best summarized in the student’s letter⁷ referred to above. It is characterized by profound pessimism, even cynicism, toward all supranational values, and presupposes the recognition only of such standards as are based on common history and loyalty to one’s own group. Outward manifestations of the attitude expressed by this particular individual include nationalistic self-righteousness, protestations of unrewarded sacrifice, unwillingness to submit to the moral or political judgment of non-German authorities except under duress, de-

nial of guilt and responsibility (except toward members of one’s own group), and abstention from all allegiances postulated by foreign powers. The latter position implies a deep distrust of democracy as a political cure-all. Any persons who freely accept new ideologies or who, in their acceptance of the new rulers, go beyond the minimum officially required, in the opinion of nationalists deserve to be ostracized and threatened. The non-conformism, self-indulgence, and even the vernacular of the neo-patriots about whom the letter writer has spoken, bring to mind slogans popular in the years following the Napoleonic victories over Prussia. They also recall the “spirit of Langemarck” fostered by German nationalists after 1918 to keep alive the self-sacrifice of Germany’s youngest battalions in World War I.

The danger of this attitude lies in the serious obstacle which any type of nihilism and wilful isolation presents to political recovery and re-education. In addition, it offers an opportunity to reactionary elements bent upon using German youth for ulterior purposes. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Liberal Democratic Party, whose leadership is at least partly suspect of strong nationalist leanings, has already approached the letter writer quoted above with the promise of wider opportunities for political agitation.

Political Apathy and Non-Conformism

Sensational accounts of subversive attempts by nationalistic elements must not be construed as signs of a wide-spread politicalization of German youth. On the contrary, the vast majority of German youth is politically unformed. That is to say, German youth is characterized by an attitude of indifference and ambivalence toward all traditional beliefs, notably political ones. The Nazi system kept them in total ignorance of any set of values other than National Socialist, and the collapse of National Socialism has left them with no creed whatever. In fact, large numbers of youths appear to have lost not only their belief but even their faculty to believe in anything. A seventeen-year-old youth confesses, possibly with a touch of self-dramatization: “I envy those who have still the ability to believe in something, even those who believe in Hitler. They at least have something to which they can cling. I have nothing, simply nothing.”⁸

The disillusionment of German youth, by and large, manifests itself in apathy toward all matters

⁶ *Franfurter Rundschau*, Feb. 19, 1946.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Hochland-Bote* (Garmisch-Partenkirchen), Jan. 9, 1946.

political and frequently in total abstention from political activity.⁹ However, juvenile apathy is not always restricted only to politics. Based on a deep distrust of civil, social, and moral controls in general, it reveals itself in tendencies toward escapism and general non-conformism. What appear to be acts of political sabotage against German or Allied authority quite frequently are part of a general pattern of antisocial behavior. Gangs of criminal juveniles are reported to be operating under the cloak of "patriotism." In such cases, political non-conformism is merely a symptom of, or a pretext for, the wilful rejection of all social controls.

Depending on external influences, however, general apathy may become the point of departure for a number of attitudes and actions which may have definite and even dangerous political implications. If deflected toward non-conformism, apathy may develop, in its extreme form, into nihilism and anarchy; it may lead to crime with or without political cloak; it may produce passive resistance, and, finally, if cleverly exploited by political agents, it may be turned into active political opposition to all authorities and groups responsible for military and civilian controls. These various stages have, however, been reached only by small sectors of German youth. Among the majority of German youth, non-conformism has not progressed beyond the verbal phase. It emerges in defection from the former system and the controls established by it, in rejection of or, at best, in abstention from the present set of controls, and in incipient attempts to formulate, independently, a new approach to society.

It is well to remember that apathy and non-conformism are the effects rather than the cause of the social break-down. They are, above all, the result of the collapse of a system which artfully undermined the authority of the traditional controls guaranteed by family, school, and church. Logically, the failure of a regime which monopolized all authority and was based on a theory of power and success was bound to result in the complete disillusionment of those who unconditionally accepted both the theory and the authority behind it.

Thus, while many youths still cling to a belief in Nazism, a number of the more disillusioned have begun to question some of the principles of Nazism and the motives of its leaders; others have

gone so far as to denounce National Socialism. Individual youths claim in letters published in the press that they feel cheated by Nazism and that they have turned their backs on their past. Former members of the party and the Hitler Youth who were born after 1920 resent being asked by employment offices about their past affiliations, express indignation at being labeled "little Nazis", and refuse to be placed on the same level with "old-timers."¹⁰ They protest that they were the victims rather than the supporters of a system which had eliminated all choice of political alternatives. Some even claim that "the majority of the former Hitler Youth recognize today that they were misled. . . ."¹¹ Young people in the U. S. zone of occupation have objected to the procedures of a political system which they allege "treats [them] just as badly as did Nazism."¹² They demand that American authorities abandon such "injustices."¹³

To judge from some utterances by youths, the fight over the responsibility for the war and Nazism often emerges as a genuine conflict between the generations. Denials of guilt are associated at times with furious attacks against parents. One young person writes: "Youth today stands aside, because the older generation shirks its responsibility. Today, all of a sudden, none of the elders will admit that he, by his very attitude, supplied a model, that he helped sway the people into this insane war and into the megalomania of the party leaders."¹⁴ Furthermore, this personal antagonism is transferred to a whole set of values which formed the cultural background of the older generation. The same correspondent quoted above says: "Cheated out of their hopes . . . youth

⁹ An inquiry in a youth magazine asking its readers "Shall we organize ourselves politically?" was answered by only 1 percent (*Frankfurter Neue Presse*, Apr. 25, 1946).

¹⁰ *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Feb. 15; *Main Post* (Würzburg), Mar. 2, 1946.

¹¹ *Main-Post*, Mar. 2, 1946.

¹² *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Feb. 15, 1946.

¹³ Foreign Broadcasting Intelligence Service: ticker, July 2, 1946. In answer to proposals originating with youth and adult authorities in the U. S. zone, General McNarney has now approved a general political amnesty for German young men and women born after January 1, 1919. Only Nazi activists and war criminals will be exempt from this pardon, which is awaiting final recommendation by the German Council of States in the U. S. zone and approval by the Military Government.

¹⁴ *Die Neue Zeitung* (Munich), Apr. 1, 1946.

must, of sheer necessity, doubt the fundamental ethical laws of human existence. Neither Mozart's *Magic Flute*, nor a church concert, nor Goethe's *Iphigenie* can help youth overcome their doubts."¹⁵

There can be little doubt that many of those who reject or deny their former association with the Nazi system and who now espouse the ideals of democracy do so for opportunistic reasons. In fairness to a large number of genuine doubters it must be said, however, that many refuse to transfer their allegiance to democracy or to any other new philosophy out of sheer personal honesty. Some concede frankly their total ignorance in matters political. Others, equally honest, explain their hesitancy in terms of fear of new disappointments. The fiasco of the Nazi system has left them with psychological traumas which may be difficult to heal. One youth confesses: "Our so-called ideals . . . were distorted, the best has been dragged through filth, and our confidence has been bitterly disappointed. Now we are . . . afraid that the same thing may happen to us once more. Today we are told of ideals the realization of which we can nowhere detect."¹⁶ The elections held in the American zone, for example, were regarded by many young people as a test for which they were insufficiently prepared. Appeals of the parties directed to youth elicited comments which indicated that they placed little confidence in the promises of candidates or in the democratic principle of reaching political decisions by popular vote.

Distrust of democracy does not arise from Nazi teachings only. It is nourished by a fallacious tendency on the part of many to accept the present political system under Military Government as full-fledged democracy and to regard bureaucratic difficulties and many of the current political and economic calamities as a logical concomitant of democratic procedures. Thus, difficulties incurred in obtaining jobs are attributed to the new system.

With few exceptions neither public authorities nor political parties have tried to overcome such misunderstandings, nor have they tried to counter-

act such impressions through the development of projects and programs exemplifying the true meaning of democratic action. Consequently, juvenile interest in democracy is determined quite often by external factors as elementary as food, jobs, and the like. In Berlin, for instance, school children have interrupted their teacher's discussion of democratic principles by shouting: "Nonsense! Democracy means hunger. We'd rather eat. Under Hitler there was no democracy, but we were better off." Or youths are reported to have put up posters reading:

"Gebt uns mehr zu essen,
Sonst können wir Hitler nicht vergessen."

These negative attitudes are only slightly balanced by positions which range from watchful waiting to outright approval. At times, German youth appears to be willing to admit democracy on a trial basis. Nevertheless, participation in politics, e. g. elections, remains conditional. Young voters have said that they "are not by any means persuaded that the parties and men for whom we voted will actually represent our interests. We have voted for the party which we deemed relatively best. . . ."¹⁷

Those individuals who are seriously groping their way toward democratic concepts reveal a peculiar naïveté in their definitions. In some cases democracy is identified with such recognized criteria as "objectivity", "tolerance", respect toward minorities, freedom of speech, and the like. Quite frequently, however, acceptance of democracy is qualified by outspoken distrust of party politics or by demands for what is called an "authoritarian" democracy—exemplified, allegedly, by England and the United States. Above all, there is a tendency to regard democracy as another governmental system (*Staatsform*) introduced by authorities from on high.¹⁸ This restricted interpretation of democracy may be attributed to a general ignorance of historical patterns in democratic countries, a profound unawareness of the applicability of democratic methods to the small community and to group life in general, and an inability to relate democratic standards to economic and social issues. Occasionally, young people realize and admit frankly their fundamental lack of knowledge and ask openly for more systematic efforts by German and Allied authorities to teach them the elements of democratic thinking.

¹⁵ This opinion is not shared by all returning veterans, some of whom give evidence that the degrading aspects of front-line life helped them rediscover the humanitarian values of the German classics.

¹⁶ *Main Post*, Mar. 2, 1946.

¹⁷ *Main Post*, Mar. 2, 1946.

¹⁸ *Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung* (Ulm), Feb. 16; *Main Post*, Mar. 2, 1946.

Definitions which reveal a certain degree of maturity come from those youths who are active in political organizations, and from workers and veterans. A suggestion made by a participant at a round-table conference of former prisoners of war in Munich merits attention. He demanded that the parties should inform youth about their objectives and that the press assist youth and treat youth problems in a conciliatory and informative fashion. He recommended that young people regularly exchange their opinions with the youth of democratic countries at conferences and proposed that German youth be allowed to visit the United States and England so that they could gather experience to be used in the reconstruction of Germany.¹⁹

Demoralization and Criminality

The immediate consequence of the desire of juveniles to escape from social controls is non-political. It is reflected in the over-all picture of progressive demoralization and, more specifically, in the statistics of the criminal police. Among an increasing number of juveniles, political apathy and non-conformism has produced an escape into superficial pleasures and mass loafing, and has led to a lowering of moral standards and to perpetration of a series of minor and major crimes. All these things, of course, are symptoms of social disorders which are caused by the food and housing shortages, the scarcity of jobs and opportunities of training,²⁰ the lack of educational and recreational facilities, and the absence of adequate supervision and moral, social, and intellectual stimuli.

Inadequate schooling and training under the Nazis has produced a youth which not only lacks

the most elementary qualifications for the resumption of employment, but no longer possesses the energy and desire to work. Uncounted numbers of juveniles, instead of applying for regular employment, choose the black market and barter to procure the needed minimum of food. Many girls do not work but prefer to obtain their rations through fraternization with occupation troops. In the words of one youth, "all work is considered forced labor." A poll conducted in one Berlin district revealed that the local youth were totally indifferent toward reconstruction work. None was interested in the building trades or in any of the other trades which urgently need labor. The fact that 80 percent of those polled said they wanted to become butchers or bakers suggests the current preoccupation with the food problem; the others wanted to become electricians or radio mechanics.²¹ Furthermore, the quality of performance by youth occupied in the labor service was so unsatisfactory that the City of Berlin proposed to stop paying for it. Outdoor work was finally discontinued in winter on account of its unproductiveness.

Interest in organized youth activities is small. For instance, youth committees in the Soviet zone have noticed a wide-spread preference for social activities, especially drinking and dancing. A large part of youth finds an outlet in crime and underground activity, ranging from waylaying of and gang warfare on Allied soldiers and pro-Allied Germans to black-market operations. Both the Berlin police and the Bavarian Minister of the Interior have reported a mounting wave of juvenile delinquency in recent months.²² The ages of these delinquents range from 8 to 23 years, with the highest frequency between 18 and 20. On January 15, 168 juveniles were reported in custody in a Berlin jail. The Juvenile Court in Munich registered a record figure of 700 criminal cases against juveniles in the first months of 1946.²³ Since existing facilities no longer met the need, the establishment of a new house of detention was being planned. A similar situation is reported from Frankfurt-am-Main, where 969 juveniles were detained and arrested from September 13 to October 30, 1945, of whom 492 were convicted by military courts.²⁴ The majority of these cases—four fifths of the more serious ones in Bavaria—involved thefts and burglaries.²⁵ The balance in-

¹⁹ *Die Neue Zeitung*, Apr. 5, 1946.

²⁰ A report of the Bavarian Minister of Labor discloses that of 81,000 juveniles who will leave the schools in July 1946 only 15 percent can be provided with apprenticeships (*Süddost-Kurier*, May 10, 1946).

²¹ A similar investigation made in Frankfurt-am-Main revealed that 65 percent of all juveniles preferred technical, academic, or commercial vocations, whereas 22 percent indicated interest in becoming mechanics, bakers, butchers, cooks, and pastry-cooks (*Stuttgarter Zeitung*, May 4, 1946).

²² *Fuldaer Volkszeitung*, Feb. 13; *Der Allgäuer* (Kempten), Feb. 19, 1946.

²³ *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), Mar. 1, 1946.

²⁴ *Marburger Presse*, Jan. 15, 1946.

²⁵ *Fuldaer Volkszeitung*, Feb. 13; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Mar. 1, 1946.

Reparation for Non-Repatriables

Article by ELI GINZBERG¹

THE AGREEMENT of the Paris Conference on Reparation² signed in January was concluded among 18 Allied Powers whose reparation claims are to be met from the western occupation zones of Germany and from appropriate German external assets. Article 8 of the Agreement made certain assets available for persons who had suffered heavily at the hands of the Nazis and who stood in dire need of aid to promote their rehabilitation and resettlement but were unable to claim the assistance of any government receiving reparation from Germany.

The specific assets made available were \$25,000,000 to be secured from the liquidation of German assets in neutral countries; all the "non-monetary gold" found by the Allies in Germany; and all the assets in neutral countries of victims of German action who died without heirs. It is estimated that the "non-monetary gold" and the "heirless funds" will amount to millions of dollars.

The Paris Conference on Reparation charged the Governments of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia in consultation with the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees to work out, in common agreement, a plan to aid in the rehabilitation and resettlement of these non-repatriable victims of German action.

In accordance with this mandate, a conference of the Five Powers was held in Paris early in June, at which was reached an "Agreement Pertaining to Reparation Funds for Non-Repatriable Victims of German Action."³

¹ U.S. Representative to the Five-Power Conference on Reparations for Non-Repatriable Victims of German Action. Dr. Ginzberg was lent for this assignment from his post as Special Assistant to the Surgeon General. He is a professor of economics at Columbia University.

² For list of signatory governments, see BULLETIN of June 16, 1946, p. 1023.

³ Printed in this issue, p. 71.

After the signing of the Paris Agreement on Reparation, but before the calling of the Five-Power Conference on Reparation for Non-Repatriables, the Allied Governments had decided to establish priority for the \$25,000,000 sum to be made available from the liquidation of German assets in neutral countries. The "non-monetary gold" is likewise available and awaits only liquidation. The overwhelming part of this "non-monetary gold", which includes wedding rings, tooth fillings, jewelry, and other personal possessions that are not restitutable, is in the United States zone in Germany.

The "heirless funds" represent assets of victims of Nazi action who died without leaving heirs. Although private international law provides in most cases for the disposition of heirless assets, the Allied Powers held that since these particular "heirless funds" arose as a result of the wilful murder of six million Jews, morality and equity demand that the proceeds from the liquidation of these assets be made available to rehabilitate and resettle the survivors of the Hitler holocaust. Exploratory negotiations with the Neutral Powers indicate that they will take a sympathetic point of view on this problem. However the successful liquidation of these assets, which are estimated to amount to many millions of dollars, can succeed only if the Neutral Powers take all necessary steps, including special legislation, to overcome the legal, administrative, and fiscal obstacles which stand in the way of identifying, collecting, and liquidating them.

Displaced persons, as such, are not eligible for benefit under the terms of article 8 of the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Reparation and of the Agreement just concluded. Eligible persons have been specifically defined as those Jewish and non-Jewish nationals of Germany and Aus-

(Continued on page 76)

German Documents: Conferences With Axis Leaders

MEMORANDUM OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE DUCE, WITH THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND COUNT CIANO ALSO PRESENT, AT SCHLOSS KLESSHEIM NEAR SALZBURG, APRIL 29, 1942

Führer's Memorandum 15/42
State Secret

At the beginning of the interview between the four, the Führer reported briefly about questions which he had discussed previously with the Duce in private. He had informed the latter in detail about the general military situation during the winter months. Severe battles had had to be fought under the most difficult weather conditions. In that connection it appeared now, looked at from after the event, that it had been a piece of good fortune that the German Army had not pressed further forward into Russia in October, for with its long lines of communications it would have suffered still more from the effects of the extraordinarily severe winter, in the course of which the temperature had descended to depths which had not been reached for the past hundred years, and the transportation difficulties which would have arisen therefrom would have produced a catastrophe.

The Duce on his part reported to the two representatives that the Führer had told him what had happened in Russia in the last months. He (the Duce) was convinced that it was a very fortunate idea that the Führer had taken the conduct of military operations into his own hands. This had happened at a moment when technical skill alone no longer sufficed for the solution of the problems. In addition to such skill, faith and will power had to be employed by which the difficulties could be overcome. When he had read the report of the Führer's taking over the supreme command, he had been much pleased, for he had known at once that now all difficulties would be overcome. He believed that the Russian winter offensive was broken and he had the impression that this point of view prevailed in other countries as well.

The Russians at the beginning of the November offensive had had a large-scale program, a more moderate program, and a small-scale program in view. The large-scale program envisaged driving the Germans back to the old frontiers of Russia. The more moderate program had the goal

of giving Moscow and Petrograd some breathing space. This goal the Russians had not attained. Only Rostov had fallen back into their hands, but Kiev and Kharkov and other important places were now as before in German possession. The character of the whole Russian counter-offensive could be seen from the fact that the Russians could refer to no names of places which they had recaptured. The Russians were probably themselves convinced that their winter offensive had been shattered. They regarded themselves principally as winter soldiers, and had at the beginning of the offensive hoped for a repetition of the fate of Napoleon. This expectation, however, had proved false, for methods of warfare and human resources and other circumstances were on this occasion completely different from the time of Napoleon, who was in command of a disunited army thrown together from all sorts of nationalities, while the German Army was an integrated and purposeful instrument. The German Army during this winter had written the finest pages of its history. Only the German soldier could have met the severe tasks imposed upon him during this winter. He (the Duce) had never doubted the endurance of the German soldier. He had always believed in that soldier's superior qualities. Without the direct leadership of the Führer and the

These are translations of documents on Italian-German conversations, secured from German Government files, and are among the German official papers which the BULLETIN is currently publishing. They have been selected and translated by J. S. Beddie, an officer in the Division of Research and Publication, Office of Public Affairs, Department of State.

For excerpts from a German handbook of propaganda directives, see BULLETIN of Mar. 3, p. 311, and Mar. 10, p. 365. The following are other German documents that have been published in the BULLETIN in the issues cited: "Relations Between the Spanish Government and European Axis", Mar. 17, p. 413; "Sumner Welles Mission, 1940", Mar. 24, p. 459; "Invasion of Norway", Apr. 28, p. 699; "Hitler's Plans for Norway and Denmark, 1942", June 2, p. 936; "Documents on Hungary", June 9, p. 984; "Relations with Japan", June 16, p. 1038; "Conferences with Axis Leaders", June 30, p. 1103.

Führer's influence, however, the situation would have been bad indeed.

The Führer added, in that connection, that in the past winter there had been days where purely technical leadership had failed and a stout heart had been necessary to overcome the difficulties. The German troops had had great teachers in the Finns, who had had a remarkable experience in the struggle with nature under winter fighting conditions.

Continuing, the Duce declared that the end of the Russian ability to resist was at hand. Also the supplies which Russia had received from abroad were very slight. They amounted to some 2,000 motor trucks, a number of pieces of artillery, and only a few airplanes. The Americans very likely had no further illusions about the condition of the Russians. The New York *Herald Tribune* had recently, in describing the Russian forces, referred to them as "a dying army".

The Japanese in the meantime were assailing the English extraordinarily severely. Following the loss of Malaya and Burma, India was now threatened. If the Japanese entered Calcutta, in spite of the internal disunity among the Indians, an uprising in India would be likely.

The American production program was pure bluff. They could not possibly build 200,000 airplanes or two ships per day as Roosevelt had proposed. The internal situation in America was not good. People now saw what war meant, and had to submit to many restrictions. Especially notable were those affecting automobiles in a country which before the war had measured its superior living standard by the fact that there was one auto to every three or four persons.

Passing to the subject of France, the Duce remarked that there, in spite of the reorganization of the cabinet, the situation had not changed. The changes were based only on shifting relations between Laval, Pétain, and Darlan. The Axis should in any case undertake no initiative with respect to France.

The Führer remarked in this connection that Laval might well receive some assistance in the economic field and in the question of hostages. Besides, an official memorandum of Benoit-Méchin had recently come to his attention in which it was clearly stated that if France wished to recover her power she would have to have arms and that the only way to secure them was through Laval and the path of collaboration.

The Duce added that one of the most influential advisers of Marshal Pétain, Charles Maurras, was an arch chauvinist and that the French in their hearts really did not believe in collaboration at all.

In connection with the Italian demands on France, the Duce remarked that the Führer had just told him that they were very moderate. The Führer had also said that for total control of the Mediterranean the possession of both shores was necessary. Therefore, Italy must secure Bizerte along with Tunis, which was a sort of creation of Italy, or "an Italian colony ruled by the French", as a French newspaper had put it. Corsica lay in the Italian zone and should naturally go to Italy. The total of the Italian demands on France, the Duce said, amounted to 6,000 square kilometers, which in comparison to France's area of 560,000 square kilometers, represented a very small demand. If Italy got these territories, then he would have nothing further to request. If, however, these minimum requirements should not be fulfilled then Italy would have fought the war without any gain.

With regard to the internal situation in Italy the Duce remarked that the Italian people had put a very severe winter behind them in which they had experienced much suffering. Since the Italians ate a great deal of bread and vegetables, but very little meat, they had taken the shortage of foodstuffs very hard. However, the morale of the people was secure. The Party would control any situation. In this connection the Duce stated further that he had built up a sort of SS from reliable Party members. The general crisis which had arisen after the loss of Cyrenaica had been completely overcome. Badoglio and Graziani had been relieved. No one spoke of them any longer. In addition the Duce had taken certain measures against some of the old generals who had adopted an attitude of reserve toward Fascism and he had undertaken a rejuvenation of the higher military command.

To sum matters up, the Duce stated that the situation could be described as good, and that if Italy had the raw materials, she would be able to take part in the eastern campaign to a much greater extent than previously.

From the point of view of population Italy included some 24,000,000 peasants and 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 tillers of small holdings living in smaller cities, for whom the food problem was of no importance. Only 12,000,000 or 13,000,000 inhabit-

ants of the larger cities, employed persons, officials, and the like were directly affected by the shortage of food. In the spring, however, some improvement would be produced there also by a larger supply of vegetables. Bread was especially necessary in the southern provinces.

The Duce concluded his observations by transmitting the greetings of the King of Italy to the Führer. He declared, with a smile, that this was the first time that the King of Italy had allowed him to convey a greeting to the Führer. This was an event for the book [*eine "Chronikepisode"*].

The Führer, on the question of grain deliveries, replied that he was convinced that in the autumn the Ukraine would be completely available for tillage and that in the next year a minimum of 7,000,000 but much more likely 10,000,000 to 12,000,000 tons of grain could be harvested there. Germany would be able to release a corresponding amount of her own grain supply. Labor was available in the Ukraine in sufficient quantity. The tractors for the most part had been already repaired and were ready for operation again. A fuel reserve for their use had been assembled. Germany would, by synthetic production and by increased Hungarian and Rumanian deliveries, have an appreciably larger quantity of fuel available and by the repair of the 9,000 to 10,000 unserviceable locomotives would have her coal transport again in full swing and would also be able to cut down fuel use by the employment of generators. The transport problem would be solved under any circumstances. Some 2,500 new locomotives would soon be put into service and later some 7,000 more would be added.

The Führer came next to a discussion of the relationship between Hungary and Rumania. Both sides misunderstood the situation. Personally he had great regard for Marshal Antonescu, but he had no confidence in Mihai Antonescu. He had stated to the Rumanians and Hungarians that if, at all costs, they wanted to wage war between themselves, he would not hinder them, but they would both lose by it. However, it would be a problem if both countries now withheld petroleum for the war which they wanted to fight between themselves later. It would be the duty of the Foreign Ministers of the Axis to deal with both countries persuasively and calmly so as to prevent an open break.

Hungary and Rumania could not complain of what they had thus far received by way of enlarge-

ments of territory. The Führer recalled that in the Czech crisis the Hungarian Prime Minister, Imredy, had visited him to warn him against war and had told him that Hungary could wage war for only three days before she would be exhausted. In the course of events, Hungary had, inclusive of the Siebenbürgen and by means of the Balkan campaign, received some 80,000 square kilometers.

The Duce remarked here how moderate were the Italian claims on France, which amounted to only 6,000 square kilometers.

Continuing, the Führer declared that Hungary had received so much new territory that she could not absorb much more.

Rumania also had not fared badly and had not only regained Bessarabia, but had even received the Transdnister territory. Rumania therefore must help especially in the matter of petroleum, effecting savings so that she could supply 100,000 to 150,000 tons more. Thereby anxiety about requirements for the Navy could be removed, although apparently the British Navy also had similar difficulties following the loss of various English oil-supplying areas.

In the further course of the conversation the Führer declared that the war could only be ended by victory and success. There must be no compromise peace. The sacrifices on the part of the Axis, which had been made in such great extent, must be paid for. He had spoken from this point of view very frankly to the German people before the Reichstag.

England would discontinue the war if she saw that she had no chance to win it. If the allies of the Three Power Pact could sink or otherwise destroy 600,000 or 700,000 to 1,000,000 tons of shipping monthly for a year, England would collapse. That moment would arrive with absolute certainty. Neither English bluff nor purposeless bombings could conceal it. The Führer had the deepest conviction that the English would fail because of the transport difficulty.

On the subject of the much-discussed landing of the English in the west, the Führer remarked that the danger would perhaps exist for two or three months longer, but not thereafter. On the west front everything was in the highest degree of readiness. The Channel Islands had been fortified and numerous batteries along the coast had been strengthened. In view of the most recent English propaganda offensive in the Channel area, the Führer expressed the opinion that more

than likely no large-scale attack from the English side was imminent, for if any one proceeded to maneuvers of the sort, it was highly unlikely that he intended to make a serious effort. In two or three months the English, because of the steadily increasing rate of sinking and destruction of ships, would no longer possess the necessary tonnage to carry out a large-scale attack on the European Continent. It must be considered that for the transport of a division 35 ships were necessary. In addition the English division required still more shipping space, since they took with them much more for their comfort and maintenance than would German divisions. For an undertaking on a grand scale the English would require at least 20 divisions.

To an interjection of the Duce that the English, in connection with their undertaking, were counting upon revolts on the Continent, the Führer replied that that would be a complete miscalculation. In Germany he no longer had any opposition. In a large city such as Berlin there was only a small element of perhaps 2,000 persons who were hostile to the regime.

In this connection the Führer spoke of what he had recently read about the Fascist revolution. He had been extraordinarily strongly impressed by the parallelism of the developments. The description of the citizenry in Italy sounded exactly like what he had had experience with in Germany.

The German people, together with the Army, stood united behind him. They were imbued with a true fanaticism and the firm conviction that only victory could end the war. Those who had lost relatives—and there was now scarcely a family where this was not the case—were the most energetic champions of a peace through victory. Anyone who would now speak of appeasement would be in danger of his life. An absolute and definite victory was the motto of the entire people.

Returning to questions of foreign policy, the Führer emphasized that Hungary and Rumania were now participating to a noteworthy degree in the war in the east.

Turkey was moving slowly but surely over to the Axis. The Turks' hatred of the Russians was especially favorable to this development. The firmer attitude of Turkey as against the enemies of the Axis could be seen in the trial of those who had attempted the assassination of Von Papen. Also the Turkish Ambassador had been recalled from Kuibyshev. The Turks were especially dis-

turbed on account of the Russian aspirations for the Dardanelles. It was also interesting that a Turkish Court had condemned the English Minister in Bulgaria, whose luggage had exploded in the Pera Hotel in Constantinople, to the payment of damages in the amount of 420,000 pounds. Turkey would never be an enemy of the Axis. At most she would remain neutral up to the end of the war. In any event, the indications were increasing that Turkey also was becoming affected by the general desire for increases in territory, and would abandon the passive attitude which she had previously adopted toward these questions, especially now when she felt herself threatened by the Russians. However, it was difficult in Turkey to determine who was promoting Turkish policy and who was promoting English policy, having been paid by England. In part the Turkish attitude would be influenced by the hatred of the Mohammedans for England, which had broken out anew as a result of the Palestine conflict.

To a question of the Duce on the subject of Turkish claims the Führer replied that he had obtained through unofficial channels an idea of Turkish desires, which were directed principally toward the railroad lines, that is, frontier adjustments in the neighborhood of Adrianople, and along the Baghdad railroad. Also the Turks would like to have Russia as far removed as possible from their own territories. The negotiations between Cripps, Eden, and Stalin had doubtless dealt also with the Dardanelles question and had disturbed Turkey very much. The telegram from Ambassador von der Schulenburg, which the Reich Foreign Minister had brought to their attention at the time in its original form, had been very enlightening, as it had outlined the claims of the Russians with respect to Turkey as they had been presented at that time by Molotov in Berlin.

The Duce remarked in that connection that he had let the Turks know that Italy had no demands on Turkey, but that on the contrary she intended to give up to Turkey the Island of Castel Rosso, which lay within Turkish national waters, as a sign of her friendship for Turkey. He had made the unofficial arrangement with Turkey through a major who was a friend of Saracoglu and who was likewise a Young Turk.

The Reich Foreign Minister remarked in the same connection that his brother-in-law, who had just returned from Turkey to Germany, had also

confirmed to him that the attitude of the Turks was becoming more favorable to the Axis.

Next the conversation turned to France. The Führer declared that the French constantly came with new requests and, in reply to an interjected remark of the Reich Foreign Minister to the effect that they had thus far received very slight concessions from Germany, he referred to the release of French prisoners, whose number had decreased from 1,960,000 to 1,100,000. The French had to be treated carefully, especially because North Africa had to be prevented from going over to the opposite side. This could have been brought about most effectively by the capture of Gibraltar and the occupation of the area across from it. This plan, however, had failed because of the Spanish. Now the English had so strengthened Gibraltar that its capture was no longer feasible. In this way Franco had allowed a favorable opportunity to escape from his hands. Any Spanish contribution was no longer in question.

About the disturbances in Yugoslavia the Führer remarked that only the sternest action would lead to success. The revolts, which because of their Communistic infection were especially dangerous, must be stamped out by employing all possible means. He would be happy if the uprising could be quickly beaten down, since the four divisions stationed in Yugoslavia were needed on the eastern front.

The Duce remarked that the situation in the former Yugoslav territory had improved, especially because of the split between the Chetniks and the Communists. Only in Bosnia in the region around Sarajevo was the situation still critical. There energetic action would have to be taken. It was a good thing that quiet prevailed in Albania.

The Führer declared that the war with Yugoslavia had brought great advantages with it. It was through it that the plans of the Russians, by which they undoubtedly had the intention of overrunning Rumania, had been crossed. If, however, there had been no disorders in the Balkans, no German troops would have been stationed in Rumania. For these reasons he was now also very glad of the Italian expedition against Greece, for thereby the entire Balkan question had been set in motion, and as a result Germany had dispatched her troops into the Balkan countries, especially to Rumania. Because of this a Russian attack on Rumania for the purpose of overrunning the Balkans had had no prospect of success. Providence

had been clearly on the side of the Axis, just as when in the Russian campaign, as a result of the bad weather and the softening of the ground, operations had had to be broken off in October, and thus the long lines of communications which would have had to have been set up as a result of further advances and which during the winter would have led to an absolute catastrophe had been avoided. Also in the case of the discovery of the Belgian and Dutch machinations directed against Germany by the arrest of English and Dutch agents at Venlo, the hand of Providence was again recognizable, for by this event the operations which had been originally set for an earlier date had been postponed, and could then be planned and carried out on a larger scale, to include Holland and Belgium.

At the remark of the Führer that it seemed that all of the problems interesting Italy and Germany had been brought up for discussion, the Reich Foreign Minister recalled that only the question of the joint declaration of the Three Powers with regard to India and Arabia remained to be taken up.

On this point the Führer declared that his attitude had been determined by his recollection of the World War. Germany would, at that time, probably have been able to conclude a separate peace with Russia had not the declaration establishing Poland as an independent kingdom come up to prevent it. If there were now issued a declaration by the Three Powers on the subject of India and Arabia it could easily result in notably increasing the English will to resistance because of the threat arising from such a declaration to the whole English world empire. Churchill could then tell his people it now was clear that the enemies of England wished to destroy her world empire and that there remained nothing but to continue the struggle. On the other hand a declaration on the subject of India and Arabia might also be the thing to give the last blow to England and to cause her to give in. This latter was the opinion of the Reich Foreign Minister.

To a question from the Duce as to whether Japan had made any proposal on her own account the Reich Foreign Minister replied in the affirmative, whereupon the Duce declared that the matter did not seem pressing to him and that it could be allowed to wait.

The Reich Foreign Minister declared that in his view England would only conclude peace if she were so backed up against the wall that she

had no longer any chance of winning the war and that, accordingly, a common declaration on the subject of India and Arabia would make the war of the Three Powers against England easier.

The Führer replied that everything depended on the military developments. A declaration of the sort described could only be effective from a military point of view if the troops of the Axis Powers stood south of the Caucasus. In such a case an uprising which might break out in the Arab areas as a result of such a declaration might be militarily useful and could be supported militarily. If, on the contrary, the declaration regarding Arabia were to be issued at the moment there were two possibilities. On the one hand the Arabs might take no notice of it. In such case, a declaration of that sort would be useless for the Axis. On the contrary, it would even be harmful, since our enemies would conclude that the influence of the Axis Powers was declining in those areas. The other possibility was that the Arabs would take notice of the declaration and would commence an uprising, which under present conditions would be suppressed by the English, who would thus capture the most effective exponents of an Arab policy friendly to the Axis and the Axis interests in Arabia would thereby suffer severe damage. Only if the Axis troops were south of the Caucasus could developments of this sort be prevented. The Führer had the greatest concern lest a proclamation released at the present moment carry with it no possibility of military assistance.

In the case of India the Japanese could, of course, intervene militarily. The Axis Powers were interested only theoretically in that country.

The Duce replied that he was entirely of the Führer's opinion. Japan could issue a declaration on her own accord, to which the Axis Powers might adhere. If, however, Germany and Italy issued a declaration with regard to the Arabs at the present moment it would be completely platonic. He did not value platonic affairs very highly. In addition under present circumstances a declaration of such a sort would be reminiscent of the democratic style and for that reason also should be rejected.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that a joint declaration on the subject of India would mean an acknowledgment on the part of Japan that the Axis Powers must have a voice on this question.

In the same connection the Führer expressed the opinion that Japan was shying off from India, since the occupation of India would be a large-scale undertaking and there was the danger that Soviet Russia might also turn in the direction of India. Japan feared the Soviet influence particularly since no people seemed so predestined for Bolshevism as the Indians. The Duce also agreed with this view. After her experiences in China, Japan might well be of the opinion that the solution of the Indian question was beyond her powers.

After the Führer had once more stated that the Arab-Indian declaration would only be a practical matter when the Axis troops stood south of the Caucasus, the Reich Foreign Minister added that Japan had made her proposal for a joint declaration some time ago and perhaps would become irritated if an answer on the part of the Axis Powers was delayed. For, just as ever, Japan's sole fear was that the Axis would still in some way become reconciled with England. Under these circumstances it seemed best to him to make a complete answer to Japan, to the effect that the Axis Powers were considering thoroughly the question of a joint statement concerning India and Arabia and that they would take a positive position on the point, but that the time for issuing such a statement must be left open.

The Duce remarked that Japan could be allowed to issue a declaration on India by herself.

The Führer replied that the Japanese should be told that the whole matter was being considered by the Axis Powers, but that from the Axis viewpoint the present moment did not seem suitable for such a declaration, since a premature appeal could have no military effect but rather might even be unfavorable to Axis interests.

The Duce stated that a misstep such as had been taken in connection with the Iraq declaration must be avoided, and that the limits of "Arabia" must be first carefully defined before assurances were given to the Arabs. By Arabia he understood only Palestine, Syria, Iraq, and Transjordan.

The Führer agreed with the Duce's last line of thought and the Reich Foreign Minister remarked that it would not be difficult to find a suitable formula.

In connection with the previous remark of the Reich Foreign Minister on the subject of the concern which might be caused to the Japanese

by a negative attitude of the Axis Powers to their proposal, the Führer thought that it was questionable whether the Japanese would take offense if the Axis came to an arrangement with England. They had finally attained everything which they had planned for. When the Reich Foreign Minister expressed his doubts as to whether the Japanese were yet of this opinion, the Führer replied that he could well believe that the Japanese would be happy if the limits of the conflict were reduced.

Returning to the question of a joint declaration, the Duce remarked that such a declaration could only be issued if a new situation arose with respect to Turkey. Lastly he asked the Reich Foreign Minister when an answer must be given to the Japanese. The latter replied that time was pressing, but the Führer did not believe that an answer was so urgent, since the Japanese had often let the Axis Powers wait for a considerable time. Finally the proposal of the Reich Foreign Minister was adopted, according to which the matter was to be discussed verbally with Oshima in the sense favored by the Führer and the Duce.

In the further course of the conversation the question came up as to whether a conflict between Japan and Russia was in the interests of the Axis. Both the Führer and the Duce held the view that, at least for the moment, an energetic attack on

the Anglo-Saxons by Japan was the most desirable activity for the latter, from which Japan should not be diverted by an attack on Soviet Russia. In this connection the Führer emphasized the numerous military obligations which Japan had already taken upon herself on her extended fronts. Too much could not be asked of her and by the creation of an additional Russian front her powers would be overtaxed. Besides, by a Japanese-Russian conflict no immediate relief would result on the German-Russian front. The divisions which Russia had stationed in Siberia for defense against Japan would remain, even if conflict did not break out there, since the lines of communication with the European front were far too long. In the same way, in the case of an outbreak of a Japanese-Russian conflict, no withdrawal of troops from the European front would take place. Rather, an important part of the military striking force of Japan would be absorbed in the conflict with Russia. For the interests of the Axis it would be better if this part also of the Japanese military forces were employed exclusively against the Anglo-Saxons.

At the conclusion of the discussion a dinner was held for a small company.

SCHMIDT

BERLIN, May 2, 1942.

PRESENT STATUS OF GERMAN YOUTH—Continued from page 55.

cluded a large number of sexual and economic crimes. The 969 young people in Frankfurt included 112 girls under 18 who were carriers of venereal diseases. According to a report by the Berlin Municipal Police,²⁶ many of the boys apprehended appeared to be more interested in the procurement of food than of money. The Berlin police president also reported that former members of the Hitler Youth comprised 90 percent of all juveniles punished in Berlin for robbery, house-breaking, or theft.²⁷ According to later official estimates, the year 1946 will produce over 11,000

juvenile prosecutions, a figure which exceeds substantially the total of such actions during 1942, when the number reached a maximum of 7,600.²⁸ Dr. Hille, director of the Main Labor Office in Munich, quoted a figure of 80 percent in describing the scope of criminality among juveniles under 22 years of age.²⁹

The fact is undeniable that the rate of juvenile delinquency is progressive. Statistics from Berlin indicate a rise of more than 100 percent over the final months of 1945 in the number of individual youths officially indicted.³⁰

[EDITOR'S NOTE: In Part II of "The Present Status of German Youth", which will appear in the BULLETIN of July 21, Dr. Kellermann will continue the discussion of general attitudes and trends, taking up subversive activities and organizations including Nazi partisans and successors, Christian Pathfinders, student groups, and non-political gangs. Also discussed in Part II will be security and welfare measures and certain youth organizations relating to rehabilitation.]

²⁶ Foreign Broadcasting Intelligence Service: ticker, Oct. 25, 1945.

²⁷ Political Intelligence Division of the British Foreign Office: *Digest for Germany and Austria*, Jan. 22, 1946.

²⁸ Foreign Broadcasting Intelligence Service: ticker, May 8, 1946.

²⁹ *Main-Echo* (Aschaffenburg), Apr. 18, 1946.

³⁰ *Der Tagesspiegel* (Berlin), Mar. 23, 1946.

International Organizations and Conferences

Calendar of Meetings

Far Eastern Commission	Washington	February 26
Council of Foreign Ministers:		
Meeting of Foreign Ministers	Paris	June 15
Meeting of Deputies	Paris	May 27—temporarily adjourned
Allied-Swedish Negotiations for German External Assets	Washington	May 31
Proposed International Emergency Food Council	Washington	June 20
U.S.-Mexican Discussions on Air Services Agreement	Mexico City	June 24
International Institute of Agriculture: Meeting of the General Assembly	Rome	July 8
Caribbean Commission	Washington	July 8-14
Conference on German-Owned Patents Outside Germany	London	July 10
International Meeting of the Sugar Council	London	July 15
International Council of Scientific Unions: Meeting of the General Assembly	London	July 24-27
International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics: Extraordinary General Assembly	Cambridge, England	July 29
UNRRA: Second Half of Fifth Session	Geneva	August 5
The United Nations:		
Security Council	New York	March 25
Military Staff Committee	New York	March 25
Economic and Social Council	New York	May 25
Commission on Atomic Energy	New York	June 14
International Health Conference	New York	June 19
UNESCO: Preparatory Commission	London	July 5-13
General Assembly: Second Part of First Session	New York	September 3

The dates in the calendar are as of July 7.

Activities and Developments

The First Session of the United Maritime Consultative Council, held in Amsterdam, terminated on June 24, 1946. The following nations were represented: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, Greece, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Czechoslovakian observers were present at the meetings.

Under the chairmanship of Mr. Oyevaar (Netherlands) the Council reviewed the work of the

Contributory Nations Committee in Washington and the Shipping Coordinating and Review Committee in London since their inception in March 1946. These committees were established by agreement among the governments concerned to facilitate the provision of shipping for the requirements of UNRRA and liberated nations. The Council concluded that the arrangements made in March were working effectively to secure the object for which they were established and to the satisfaction of the nations concerned.

The Council also heard and discussed statements by delegations on current shipping policy of their governments. The Council had on its agenda the question of the establishment of an intergovernmental organization dealing with international shipping matters. The view generally expressed was that an international governmental body is likely to be required to provide for consultation on all matters suitable for intergovernmental discussion as regards shipping, and the Council concluded the examination of this item of their agenda by resolving to appoint a committee to consider in more detail the possible constitution, scope, and procedure of such a body and to draw up a draft report on the subject for further consideration by the Council. Arrangements are being made for this committee to begin its work in the course of the next few weeks. Represented on the committee will be the following nations: Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. There will be opportunity for other governments who are members of the Council to state views to the committee.

Since the UMCC was established as a transitional organization and by its terms of reference is due to terminate not later than October 31, 1946, it is expected to meet again in the autumn to consider the report of the committee.

In the meantime the Netherlands Government has accepted the invitation of the Council to perform the secretarial duties of the Council.

In the course of the session delegations had the opportunity of seeing the great progress made in restoring facilities in the ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

[Released to the press July 3]

Caribbean Commission. Representatives of the Governments of France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America will meet in Washington July 8-14 to consider plans for the establishment of a Secretariat for the Caribbean Commission in the Caribbean area, its organization and location, and the selection of a Secretary General.

A meeting of the expanded Caribbean Commission, which now includes France and the Netherlands in addition to the United Kingdom and the United States, will be held during the same period, to discuss the implementation of certain recommendations of the Second Session of the West Indian Conference.

The metropolitan governments will be represented as follows: Governor Georges H. Parisot, Ministry of French Overseas Territories and Commissioner, French Section, Caribbean Commission; Professor Dr. J. C. Kielstra, Netherlands Minister to Mexico and Co-Chairman, Netherlands Section, Caribbean Commission; G. F. Seel, C.M.G., Assistant Under Secretary of State, United Kingdom Colonial Office; and Charles W. Taussig, Co-Chairman of the United States Section of the Caribbean Commission, who will preside over the meetings.

Also participating will be the Commissioners of the four national sections of the Caribbean Commission: France—Jean de la Roche; the Netherlands—L. A. H. Peters; the United Kingdom—Sir John Macpherson, K.C.M.G., R. D. H. Arundell, O.B.E., Norman W. Manley, K.C.; the United States—Ralph J. Bunche, Rafael Pico, and Governor Rexford G. Tugwell.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: The following executive nominations were confirmed by the Senate on July 3, 1946:

John W. Snyder to be United States Governor of the International Monetary Fund and United States Governor of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for a term of five years.

John S. Hooker to be United States Alternate Executive Director of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for a term of two years and until his successor has been appointed.

George F. Luthringer to be United States Alternate to the Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund for a term of two years and until his successor has been appointed.

Record of the Week

Independence of the Philippines

[Released to the press by the White House July 4]

By the President of the United States of America

A PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS the United States of America by the Treaty of Peace with Spain of December 10, 1898, commonly known as the Treaty of Paris, and by the Treaty with Spain of November 7, 1900, did acquire sovereignty over the Philippines, and by the Convention of January 2, 1930, with Great Britain did delimit the boundary between the Philippine Archipelago and the State of North Borneo; and

WHEREAS the United States of America has consistently and faithfully during the past forty-eight years exercised jurisdiction and control over the Philippines and its people; and

WHEREAS it has been the repeated declaration of the legislative and executive branches of the Government of the United States of America that full independence would be granted the Philippines as soon as the people of the Philippines were prepared to assume this obligation; and

WHEREAS the people of the Philippines have clearly demonstrated their capacity for self-government; and

WHEREAS the Act of Congress approved March 24, 1934, known as the Philippine Independence Act, directed that, on the 4th Day of July immediately following a ten-year transitional period leading to the independence of the Philippines, the President of the United States of America should by proclamation withdraw and surrender all rights of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control, or sovereignty of the United States of America in and over the territory and people of the Philippines, except certain reservations therein or there-

after authorized to be made, and, on behalf of the United States of America, should recognize the independence of the Philippines:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid act of Congress, do proclaim that, in accord with and subject to the reservations provided for in the applicable statutes of the United States,

The United States of America hereby withdraws and surrenders all rights of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control, or sovereignty now existing and exercised by the United States of America in and over the territory and people of the Philippines; and,

On behalf of the United States of America, I do hereby recognize the independence of the Philippines as a separate and self-governing nation and acknowledge the authority and control over the same of the government instituted by the people thereof, under the constitution now in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this Fourth day of July in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and forty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-first.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

By the President:

DEAN ACHESON

Acting Secretary of State.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S STATEMENT ON PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE

[Released to the press by the White House July 3]

The independence achieved today by the Philippines comes after a period of 48 years of American sovereignty over the Islands. Throughout this period it has been the consistently expressed policy of this Government, as revealed in the Instructions of President McKinley to the Philippine Commission, the Jones Law, and the Tydings-McDuffie Law, to prepare the people of the Philippines for independence. An ever increasing measure of self-government has been granted to the Filipino people as year after year they demonstrated their capacity for democratic self-government.

With independence, the Republic of the Philippines is admittedly confronted with many difficult problems. Almost any new nation facing independence would be confronted with similar problems.

I am confident, however, that the Filipino people will meet the challenge of independence with courage and determination. The United States stands ready to assist the Philippines in every way possible during the years to come. Together, solutions will be found for the problems which the Philippines will encounter.

It is more than symbolic that our two countries should be jointly celebrating July 4 as Independence Day. It is my hope that each succeeding July 4 will constitute a milestone of progress along the path of mutual cooperation for the achievement of international understanding and well-being.

STATEMENT BY ACTING SECRETARY ACHESON

[Released to the press July 3]

I am happy to be able to extend my greetings to the people of the Philippines on this the occasion of the formal establishment of the independent Republic of the Philippines.

The United States first acquired a significant interest in the Philippines at the close of the last century. At that time, by the Treaty of Paris, the United States acquired sovereignty over the Philippines. During the next 48 years the United States held the sovereign responsibility for the Islands.

Throughout the period of American sovereignty in the Philippines the United States has worked to

prepare the Philippines for independence. The Filipino people worked diligently to prepare themselves for independence and they responded eagerly to the efforts of the United States Government to transfer to them the institutions of self-government. They have displayed a fealty to the principles of democratic government which materially aided them on the road to independence. Together, the American and Filipino peoples contributed to the building of Philippine independence.

Today, when the proclamation of Philippine independence is read in Manila, the dream of the Filipino people for independence will at last have been realized.

Out of independence many new problems will develop for the Philippines. The United States would be falling short of its duty to its sister Republic if we were not to assist the Philippines in every way to meet these new problems.

May there be born out of this new relationship between the American and Filipino peoples a spirit of friendship which will cause the two countries to work harmoniously together in promoting world peace and security.

SPECIAL RADIO PROGRAM CELEBRATING PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE

[Released to the press July 3]

A special 55-minute short-wave radio program saluting the granting of independence to the Republic of the Philippines by the United States was beamed to the Islands on July 3 at 4:05 p.m., Pacific Standard Time (7:05 p.m., Eastern Standard Time, and 8:05 a.m., July 4, Manila Time) by the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs of the State Department. The program was repeated to the Philippines the following morning.

A message by President Truman to the Philippines was carried on 29 transmitters from the east and west coasts. It was heard in 25 countries of South America and Europe, as well as in the Philippines, Netherlands East Indies, Japan, China, and India.

Other voices heard on the San Francisco program included: Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson; Frank Murphy, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court; Admiral Chester Nimitz; Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations; Frank Lockhart, Chief of the

Division of Philippine Affairs, State Department; Carlos P. Romulo, former Resident Commissioner of the Philippine Commonwealth; Senator Millard E. Tydings of Maryland; Representatives Karl Stefan of Nebraska and C. Jasper Bell of Missouri; General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower; and General Jonathan W. Wainwright. A message from Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson was read.

Others heard on programs from the New York office of OIC were Dorothy Canfield Fisher, Sgt. Irving Strobins, who broadcast the description of the fall of Corregidor and spent more than three years as a prisoner of the Japanese; Dr. Francisco Castillo Nájera, Mexico's Foreign Minister; Gene Manuel, representing the Filipinos in New York, speaking to his countrymen.

At 4:30 p.m., Pacific Standard Time, two additional transmitters joined those beamed to the Far East and President Truman's message went on the air as the climax of the official presentation, which closed with the Star Spangled Banner. The Philippines national anthem opened the program.

A repeat release was given at 2:05 a.m., Pacific Standard Time, July 4 from San Francisco.

The transmissions to Europe began at 12:30 p.m., Eastern Standard Time, July 4.

Texts of two of the messages follow:

Message of the President¹

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES:

I am indeed happy to be able to join with you in the formal inauguration of the Republic of the Philippines.

This is a proud day for our two countries. For the Philippines it marks the end of a centuries-old struggle for freedom. For the United States it marks the end of a period of almost fifty years of cooperation with the Philippines looking toward independence.

Now the new Republic faces the problems of independent nationhood. These problems will be difficult and trying. The road to independence has not been an easy one. The road of independence will likewise not be an easy one. The mettle of a

people, the mettle of a nation, are on trial before the world.

But the United States has faith in the ability and in the determination of the Philippine people to solve the problems confronting their country. The men who defied Magellan, who fought for a Republic in 1898, and who more recently on Bataan, Corregidor, and at a hundred other unsung battle-grounds in the Philippines flung back the Japanese challenge, will not lack the courage which is necessary to make government work in peace as well as in war. The will to succeed, I am sure, will continue to govern the actions of the Philippine people.

The United States, moreover, will continue to assist the Philippines in every way possible. A formal compact is being dissolved. The compact of faith and understanding between the two peoples can never be dissolved. We recognize that fact and propose to do all within our power to make Philippine independence effective and meaningful.

Our two countries will be closely bound together for many years to come. We of the United States feel that we are merely entering into a new partnership with the Philippines—a partnership of two free and sovereign nations working in harmony and understanding. The United States and its partner of the Pacific, the Philippine Republic, have already charted a pattern of relationships for all the world to study. Together in the future, our two countries must prove the soundness and the wisdom of this great experiment in Pacific democracy.

May God protect and preserve the Republic of the Philippines!

Message of Acting Secretary of State Acheson

On July the fourth, the people of the United States are celebrating their one hundred and seventy-first Independence Day. Some seven thousand miles across the Pacific, you, the people of the Philippine Islands have gathered to celebrate your first Independence Day. Representatives of the United States and Philippine Governments are met now to proclaim the dawn of Philippine independence and the establishment of the Republic of the Philippines.

This is a proud and glorious day in the history of our two countries. It is a day which I would like to think has been achieved by the joint efforts and sacrifices of the two peoples.

¹ The message was broadcast to the Philippines by the International Broadcasting Division of the Department of State in a program beginning at 7:30 p.m., E. S. T., on July 3, 1946. The message was released for publication or radio announcement at that time. The broadcast was by short wave from San Francisco at 4:30 p.m., P. C. T.

History records few more consistent efforts on the part of a people for independent status than the efforts of the Filipino people for independence during the past forty-eight years. Likewise history records few such consistent efforts on the part of a sovereign power to bring about the independence of a dependent area as in the case of the United States toward the Philippines. When the United States flag replaced the Spanish flag in the Philippines in 1898, some Filipinos feared that the hopes of the Filipino people for independence were to be indefinitely delayed. But from the beginning American administrators showed that we had come to the Philippines with the interests of the Filipino people at heart. Step by step the institutions of self-government were transferred to the Filipino people and the way cleared for independence.

The Filipino people almost at the outset were given control over their own municipal governments. Soon, through the suffrage, they were given the power to select most of their provincial governments. In due course Filipino control extended to the central government. Powers originally given the American Governor General were gradually transferred to Filipino hands. Filipino judges were chosen for the bench, Filipinos were given the posts of heads of the executive departments, and the Philippine legislature consisting of a House of Representatives and Senate was an exclusively Filipino institution. The policy enunciated by the United States Congress in the Jones Law of 1916 when it stated that "it was desirable to place in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control in their domestic affairs as can be given them . . ." was consistently followed by this Government and to such an extent that at times some Americans feared we had gone beyond the bounds of reasonable discretion.

With the passing of each year the capacity of the Filipino people for independence became more manifest. When the Congress of the United States in the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 declared that the *Philippines* was to be granted its

independence in 1946, the goal of the Filipino people was at last in sight. Now on July 4, 1946, that goal has been achieved.

Independence for the Philippines brings with it great satisfaction and joy. But no one would deny that independence also brings with it new and heavy responsibilities. A few days ago the Resident Commissioner of the Philippines in his farewell address to the United States Congress stated, "You in America may ask, in these unsettled times, where we in the Philippines shall stand? And we answer, *by your side!* Not in slavish imitation, not because of pressure, but by profound conviction that we belong beside America." We in the United States welcome this pledge of comradeship on the part of the Filipino people. We intend to assist your country in every way possible to meet the challenging problems of independence.

The Department of State will be interested in the economic well-being and the military security of the Philippines, and already we have joined our efforts with those of other agencies of this Government to seek the attainment of these objectives. We are also, as the department responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs, keenly interested in the foreign affairs establishment which you will now create. Through our Philippine Foreign Affairs Training Program, which we hope to continue after independence, we have sought to provide you with the nucleus of personnel for a Philippine Foreign Service. During the early days of Philippine independence we plan also to assist you in handling Philippine interests abroad. Your new Department of Foreign Affairs and our State Department should work closely together.

In these and many other ways the Philippines and the United States will join hands to insure the perpetuation and advancement of the ideals and objectives which have animated our two countries in the past and will, I believe, continue to animate our two countries in the future. An independent and a democratic Philippines now and forever!

Policy of Transferring 100,000 Jewish Immigrants to Palestine

CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE

[Released to the press by the White House July 2]

The President conferred on July 2 with the following American members of the Jewish Agency Executive: Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Mr. Louis Lipsky, and Rabbi Abba H. Silver.

The representatives of the Jewish Agency gave the President their views of recent events in Palestine.

The President expressed his regret at these developments in Palestine. He informed the representatives of the Jewish Agency that the Government of the United States had not been consulted on these measures prior to their adoption by the British Government. He expressed the hope that the leaders of the Jewish community in Palestine would soon be released and that the situation would soon return to normal.

The President added further that it was his determination that these most recent events should mean no delay in pushing forward with a policy of transferring 100,000 Jewish immigrants to Palestine with all dispatch, in accordance with the statement he made upon the receipt of the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The President indicated that the Government of the United States was prepared to assume technical and financial responsibility for the transportation of these immigrants from Europe to Palestine.

He expressed his thanks for the workmanlike suggestions embodied in the letter which the American members of the Jewish Agency Executive sent him on June 14 with respect to the technical and financial problems involved in the transfer and resettlement of the 100,000 immigrants.

REMARKS MADE AT ACTING SECRETARY ACHESON'S PRESS CONFERENCE

On July 2 Acting Secretary Acheson at his press and radio news conference told newsmen that United States technical experts who went to London to discuss implementation of the Palestine report, and who returned last weekend, had reported progress.

The Acting Secretary made it clear that the task of the experts in London was to study technical aspects of the problem and not to make decisions. He said they were now conferring with the special cabinet committee, headed by Henry F.

Grady, named as the Secretary of State's alternate. Mr. Acheson also stated that the committee plans to leave for London on about July 15, though there is possibility of an earlier departure.

The Acting Secretary said experts were working mainly on details of moving 100,000 Jews into Palestine, as recommended in Anglo-American Palestine report,¹ and that they did not discuss the subject of United States military aid to British in Palestine.

The Acting Secretary reiterated that the State Department had not received information in advance of what action the British planned to take in Palestine.

¹ For text of the Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, see Department of State Publication 2536.

Agreement Pertaining to Reparation Funds for Non-Repatriable Victims of German Action¹

[Released to the press June 19]

Agreement has been reached by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia in conference at Paris concerning matters pertaining to making available certain reparation funds for the rehabilitation and resettlement of non-repatriable victims of German action.

The agreement was worked out in accordance with the provisions of Article VIII of the final Act of the Paris Conference on Reparation, signed by 18 nations on January 14, 1946, which made available a fund of \$25,000,000 out of German assets in neutral countries, out of all the non-monetary gold found by the Allies in Germany, and out of all the assets in neutral countries of victims of Nazi action who died without heirs.² The conferring powers are of the opinion that the non-monetary gold and the "heirless funds" will amount to a few million dollars.

Since the overwhelming group of eligible victims were Jewish, the conference allocated \$22,500,000 out of German assets in neutral countries, 90 percent of the non-monetary gold, and 95 percent of the "heirless funds" for the rehabilitation and resettlement of Jews. The remaining part of the fund was made available for those German and Austrian non-Jewish victims who were persecuted by the Nazis for religious, political, or racial reasons and who are in need of resettlement. The agreement gave general administrative responsibility to the Director of the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees, who will make funds available to authorized field organizations.

It is expected that the authorized Jewish field organizations will use a large part of these funds for the rehabilitation of refugees and for the resettlement in Palestine.

The United States representative was Dr. Eli Ginzberg of Columbia University. He was assisted by Irwin Mason and Jacob Kaplan of the Department of State.

Text of agreement

In accordance with the provisions of Article VIII of the final Act of the Paris Conference on Reparation, the Governments of the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom, Czecho-

slovakia and Yugoslavia, in consultation with the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees, have worked out, in common agreement, the following plan to aid in the rehabilitation and resettlement of non-repatriable victims of German action. In working out this plan the signatory powers have been guided by the intent of Article VIII and the procedures outlined below are based on its terms:

In recognition of special and urgent circumstances, the sum of \$25,000,000 having been made available by the Allied Governments as a priority on the proceeds of the liquidation of German assets in neutral countries, is hereby placed at the disposal of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees or its successor organization for distribution to appropriate public and private field organizations as soon as they have submitted practicable programs in accordance with this agreement.

(A) It is the unanimous and considered opinion of the Five Powers that in light of paragraph H of Article VIII of the Paris Agreement on Reparation, the assets becoming available should be used not for the compensation of individual victims but for the rehabilitation and resettlement of persons in eligible classes, and that expenditures on rehabilitation shall be considered as essential preparatory outlays to resettlement. Since all available statistics indicate beyond any reasonable doubt that the overwhelming majority of eligible persons under the provisions of Article VIII are Jewish, all assets except as specified in paragraph B below are allocated for the rehabilitation and resettlement of eligible Jewish victims of Nazi action, among whom children should receive preferential assistance. Eligible Jewish victims of Nazi action are either refugees from Germany or Austria who do not desire to return to these countries, or German and Austrian Jews now resident in Germany or Austria who desire to emigrate, or Jews who were nationals or former nationals of previously occupied countries and who were victims of Nazi concentration camps or concentra-

¹ Telegraphic text.

² For text of final act see BULLETIN of Jan. 27, 1946, p. 114.

tion camps established by regimes under Nazi influence.

(B) The sum of \$2,500,000, amounting to 10 percent, arising out of the \$25,000,000 priority on the proceeds of German assets in neutral countries, 10 percent of the proceeds of the "non-monetary gold," and 5 percent of the "heirless funds" shall be administered by the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees or its successor organization through appropriate public and private organizations for the rehabilitation and resettlement of the relatively small numbers of non-Jewish victims of Nazi action who are in need of resettlement. Eligible non-Jewish victims of Nazi action are refugees from Germany and Austria who can demonstrate that they were persecuted by the Nazis for religious, political, or racial reasons and who do not desire to return, or German and Austrian nationals, similarly persecuted, who desire to emigrate.

(C) The Director of the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees or the Director General of the successor organization shall under the mandate of this agreement make funds available for programs submitted by the appropriate field organizations referred to in paragraphs A and B above as soon as he has satisfied himself that the programs are consistent with the foregoing. Only in exceptional circumstances may the cost of resettlement programs exceed a maximum of \$1,000 per adult and \$2,500 per child under 12 years of age. The action of the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees or its successor organization shall be guided by the intent of Article VIII and by this agreement which is to place into operation as quickly as possible practicable programs of rehabilitation and resettlement submitted by the appropriate field organizations.

(D) In addition to the \$25,000,000 the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees or its successor organization is hereby authorized to take title from the appropriate authorities to all "non-monetary gold" found by the Allies in Germany and to take such steps as may be needed to liquidate these assets as promptly as possible, due consideration being given to secure the highest possible realizable value. As these assets are liquidated, the funds shall be distributed in accordance with paragraphs A and B above.

(E) Furthermore, pursuant to paragraphs C and E of Article VIII, in the interest of justice, the French Government on behalf of the five gov-

ernments concluding this agreement, are making representations to the neutral powers to make available all assets of victims of Nazi action who died without heirs. The governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia are associating themselves with the French Government in making such representations to the neutral powers. The conclusion that 95 percent of the "heirless funds" thus made available should be allocated for the rehabilitation and resettlement of Jewish victims takes cognizance of the fact that these funds are overwhelmingly Jewish in origin, and the 5 percent made available for non-Jewish victims is based upon a liberal presumption of "heirless funds" non-Jewish in origin. The "heirless funds" to be used for the rehabilitation and resettlement of Jewish victims of Nazi action should be made available to appropriate field organizations. The "heirless funds" to be used for the rehabilitation and resettlement of non-Jewish victims of Nazi action should be made available to the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees or its successor organization for distribution to appropriate public and private field organizations. In making these joint representations, the signatories are requesting the neutral countries to take all necessary action to facilitate the identification, collection, and distribution of these assets which have arisen out of a unique condition in international law and morality. If further representations are indicated the governments of the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom will pursue the matter on behalf of the signatory powers.

(F) To insure that all funds made available shall inure to the greatest possible benefit of the victims whom it is desired to assist, all funds shall be retained in the currency from which they arise and shall be transferred therefrom only upon the instructions of the organization to which the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees or its successor organization has allocated the funds for expenditure.

(G) The Director of the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees shall carry out his responsibilities to the five governments in respect of this agreement in accordance with the terms of the letter of instruction which is being transmitted to him by the French Government on behalf of the governments concluding this agreement.

In witness whereof the undersigned have signed the present agreement.

Done in Paris, on the fourteenth day of June, 1946, in the English and French languages, the two texts being equally authentic, in a single original which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic, certified copies thereof being furnished by that government to the signatories of this present agreement.

Delegate of the United States of America.

ELI GINZBERG

Delegate of Czechoslovakia.

D. KLVANA

Delegate of France.

PHILIPPE PERIER

Delegate of the United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland.

DOUGLAS MACKILLOP

Delegate of Yugoslavia.

M. D. JAKSIC.

Annex to the Agreement on a Plan for Allocation of a Reparation Share to Non-Repatriable Victims of German Action:

In accepting the phrasing of paragraph E of the agreement, the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav delegates have declared that the Republic of Czechoslovakia and the Republic of Yugoslavia have not by so accepting given up their claim to the forthcoming inheritances mentioned therein which, according to the provisions of international law, belong to their respective states.

PARIS, 14th June, 1946.

The Czechoslovak Delegate

D. KLVANA

The Yugoslav Delegate

M. D. JAKSIC

Negotiations for Double-Tax Treaties With Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands

[Released to the press July 3]

The United States Government is preparing to send a delegation to Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands to negotiate double-tax treaties with those countries. The delegation is expected to leave Washington July 22. Prior to that time the delegation would be glad to confer with interested parties or to receive statements and suggestions from them concerning problems in tax relations with those countries. Communications in this connection should be addressed to Eldon P. King, Special Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Washington, D.C., who will head the delegation.

The United States has treaties with Sweden and France for the avoidance of double income taxes and for administrative cooperation and has treaties with Canada for the avoidance of double taxation on incomes and estates and for administrative cooperation. It is expected that ratifications of similar treaties with the United Kingdom and

Northern Ireland relating to income and estate taxes will be exchanged in the near future. Negotiations for a new treaty with France and for treaties with the Union of South Africa have been announced and are in an advanced stage. The treaties which it is hoped will be negotiated with Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands will be of the same general type.

The United States Delegation is as follows:

Eldon P. King, Special Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue, *Chief of Delegation*

Roy Blough, Director, Division of Tax Research, Treasury Department

Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Legislative Counsel, Treasury Department

Henry S. Bloch, Division of Tax Research, Treasury Department

Cyril E. Heilemann, Office of the Legislative Counsel, Treasury Department

Peter J. Mitchell, Office of the Chief Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue

William V. Whittington, Treaty Adviser, Treaty Branch, Division of Research and Publication, Department of State

Protocol Dissolving Rome Institute of Agriculture¹

THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE OF TRANSMITTAL TO THE SENATE

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith a certified photostatic copy of a protocol dated at Rome March 30, 1946, terminating the Rome convention of June 7, 1905, and transferring the functions and assets of the International Institute of Agriculture to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

The protocol has been signed, "Subject to ratification," by the American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim at Rome for the Government of the

United States of America (including Hawaii, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands).

I also transmit herewith, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Acting Secretary of State with respect to the protocol.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,

July 1, 1946.

(Enclosures: (1) Report of the Acting Secretary of State; (2) Protocol dated at Rome, March 30, 1946, terminating Rome convention of June 7, 1905, and transferring functions and assets of International Institute of Agriculture to Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.)²

REPORT OF THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

June 27, 1946.

The PRESIDENT,

The White House:

The undersigned, the Acting Secretary of State, has the honor to lay before the President, with a view to its transmission to the Senate to receive the advice and consent of that body to ratification, if his judgment approve thereof, a certified photostatic copy of a protocol dated at Rome, March 30, 1946, terminating the Rome convention of June 7, 1905, and transferring the functions and assets of the International Institute of Agriculture to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

The protocol has been signed by the American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim at Rome for the Government of the United States of America (including Hawaii, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands) "Subject to ratification." The protocol has been signed also by the plenipotentiaries of a number of other countries, and it is anticipated that additional signatures will be affixed by August 1, 1946.

The convention for the creation of an International Institute of Agriculture was signed at Rome, June 7, 1905, by the plenipotentiaries of the United States of America and a number of other countries. The United States of America became a party to that convention by the deposit of its instrument of ratification with the Italian Government on August 13, 1906. The official citation of the convention is 35 Statutes, part 2, 1918.

In 1924, at the request of the Government of the United States of America, and in conformity with the last paragraph of article 10 of the convention of 1905, Hawaii, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands were admitted to participation in the International Institute of Agriculture.

On April 21, 1926, there was signed at Rome on behalf of a number of countries, not including the United States of America, a protocol amending the convention of 1905. The United States of America became a party to that protocol on August 25, 1934, by adherence. In depositing the instrument of adherence, the American Ambassador at Rome informed the Italian Foreign Office that the adherence of the United States of America to the protocol extends to and embraces Hawaii, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Is-

¹ S. Exec. H.

² Not printed.

lands. The official citation of that protocol is 49 Statutes, part 2, 3350.

By joint resolution of the Congress of the United States of America, approved July 31, 1945 (Public Law 174, 79th Cong.), the President was authorized to accept membership for the United States of America in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Section 3 of that joint resolution refers to the contemplated dissolution of the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome and the merger of its functions and assets with those of the Food and Agriculture Organization. Section 3 reads as follows:

In adopting this joint resolution, it is the sense of the Congress that the Government of the United States should use its best efforts to bring about, as soon as practicable, the integration of the functions and resources of the International Institute of Agriculture with those of the Organization, in a legal and orderly manner, to effect one united institution in such form as to provide an adequate research, informational, and statistical service for the industry of agriculture.

At the first meeting of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, at Quebec, October 16 to November 1, 1945, the Conference (the governing body of the Organization) adopted unanimously a resolution requesting that those governments which are members of both the Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Institute of Agriculture take action for the purpose of bringing to an end the affairs of the Institute and of transferring the library, archives, and other property of the Institute to the Organization.

The Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization, by a letter dated November 10, 1945, requested that the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium work together to give effect to the Quebec resolution relating to the dissolution of the International Institute of Agriculture.

During January and February 1946 the Government of the United States of America, after prior consultation with the British Government, communicated with the other governments, members of both the Organization and the Institute, urging the cooperation of those governments in the adop-

tion of procedure for the dissolution of the Institute and the merger of its functions and assets with those of the Organization.

On March 30, 1946, the Permanent Committee of the International Institute of Agriculture, meeting in Rome, adopted without dissenting vote a resolution prepared by the United States Government and presented to the Committee by the American and British representatives on the Committee. This resolution urged that each of the governments concerned authorize the signing on its behalf of a protocol for the purpose of dissolving the Institute, terminating the convention which created it, and transferring its functions and assets to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. The resolution also urged that the General Assembly of the Institute take action to authorize the Permanent Committee to take the necessary steps for this purpose.

The protocol, as recommended by the Permanent Committee of the Institute, was opened for signature on March 30, 1946, and bears that date. It is this protocol of which a certified photostatic copy is enclosed herewith.

Article I of the protocol provides that from a date which is to be announced by the Permanent Committee of the Institute, in accordance with article III, the convention of 1905 shall be no longer effective as between the parties to the protocol, and the Institute (including the International Forestry Center) thereupon shall be brought to an end.

Article III provides for the giving of a notification by the Permanent Committee to the members of the Institute when the duties assigned by article II of the protocol have been completed. It is provided further that the date of such notification shall be deemed to be the date of termination of the convention of 1905 and also the date of the dissolution of the Institute (including the Center).

Article IV provides for the transfer to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the powers, rights, or duties attributed to the Institute (including the Center) by the provisions of certain international conventions, as listed in an annex to the protocol.

Article V sets forth the procedure by which a member of the Institute which is not a signatory to the protocol may accede to the protocol.

Article VI contains provisions relating to the

coming into force of the protocol. Pursuant to this article, the protocol shall come into force when it has been accepted by at least 35 governments, members of the Institute. Such acceptance may be effected by any one of three methods, namely, by signature alone when such signature is without a reservation in regard to ratification, by the deposit of an instrument of ratification in the case of signature with a reservation in regard to ratification, or by notice of accession in accordance with article V. The coming into force of the protocol for other governments, after the protocol has come into force, as provided in the second paragraph of article VI, is governed by the third paragraph.

In the opinion of the Department of State, this protocol, together with the action to be taken by the General Assembly and the Permanent Committee of the Institute, would accomplish the object mentioned in section 3 of the joint resolution

of July 31, 1945, namely, the integration of the functions and resources of the Institute with those of the Organization, in a legal and orderly manner, effecting—

one united institution in such form as to provide an adequate research and statistical service for the industry of agriculture.

It is believed that, in order to be fully effective, the action of the United States of America with respect to this protocol should be completed as soon as practicable.

Respectfully submitted,

DEAN ACHESON,
Acting Secretary of State.

(Enclosure: Protocol dated at Rome, March 30, 1946, terminating Rome convention of June 7, 1905, and transferring functions and assets of International Institute of Agriculture to Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.)¹

REPARATION FOR NON-REPATRIABLES—Continued from page 56.

tria who do not desire to be repatriated, or who are still in Germany and Austria and should be assisted to emigrate because of the persecution which they suffered at the hands of the Nazis. Also eligible are Jews who were nationals or former nationals of previously occupied countries and who were victims of Nazi concentration camps or concentration camps established by regimes under Nazi influence. The total number of eligibles is estimated to be in excess of 200,000, the vast majority of whom are Jews.

The funds to be made available cannot be used for relief but must be spent on the rehabilitation and resettlement of eligible persons. The Agreement provides that the Director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, who has been given general administrative responsibility, will make the funds available to appropriate field organizations as soon as they have submitted practical programs for the rehabilitation and resettlement of the eligible victims. It is expected that the authorized Jewish field organizations will use a large part of these funds for the rehabilitation of refugees and for their resettlement in Palestine.

The United States has played a leading role in securing reparations for non-repatriables. The

United States Delegation to the Paris Conference on Reparation first advanced the proposal in November 1945 and secured its adoption by the other powers. The United States took the lead in making the \$25,000,000 sum a priority charge on the liquidation of German assets in neutral countries. The United States pressed for an early meeting of the Five-Power Conference. The draft agreement submitted to the Conference was prepared by the United States representative.

Despite the many difficulties encountered in dealing with refugee problems in the several United Nations committees and conferences, the Paris Conference on Reparation for Non-Repatriables was able to proceed in an atmosphere of harmonious understanding and reach a unanimous agreement at the end of two days. All the delegates were impressed with the fact that no matter what differences separated them on the general refugee problem, it was their obligation to act expeditiously and efficiently with regard to those non-repatriables eligible for assistance under the provisions of article 8. Most of them are Jews whose suffering under the Nazis had been without parallel. The Conference recognized that their rehabilitation and resettlement was the obligation of all civilized nations.

¹ Not printed.

Ceremonies Commemorating Liberation of Belgium

[Released to the press July 3]

The Belgian Ambassador has informed the Department that on July 4 ceremonies will take place at Bastogne under the auspices of the Belgian American Association and in the presence of high officials of the Belgian Government to commemorate the gallant stand of the American Armies and the liberation of Belgium. The first stone of a monument is to be laid. Earth is to be placed in an urn made of Belgian Congo malachite, handed to the American Ambassador, and later flown to the United States by a C-54 of Belgium to arrive in Washington on July 8.

The Belgian Embassy states that the following will accompany the urn:

Col. Raoul Defraiteur, Minister of National Defense
Senator Paul van Zeeland, President, Belgo-American Association

Mr. Jacques LaGrange, Secretary, Belgo-American Association

Group Capt. Leon Desoomer, aide-de-camp

The State and War Departments have made the following arrangements to receive the urn in Washington:

Brig. Gen. Gerald J. Higgins, an officer of the 101st Airborne Division during the Battle of Bastogne, has been sent to Belgium to attend the ceremony and fly back with the urn.

Full military honors are to be rendered upon arrival at the Washington National Airport on July 8, 3 p. m.

Visit of Egyptian Journalists

[Released to the press June 29]

Four distinguished Egyptian journalists, representing government, opposition, and independent newspapers, arrived here June 29 on the final phase of a seven weeks' inspection tour of the United States as guests of the Department of State. The tour has taken the visitors from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from the Canadian to the Mexican borders.

The journalists are Galal el Hamamsi, managing editor of *Al Kotla*, Bloc Wafdist daily; Nagib

Canaan, foreign editor of the leading independent daily, *Al Ahram*; Abdel Kader Hamza, associate editor of *Al Balagh*, leading Wafdist (Nationalist) daily; and Fahmy Samaha, vice president of the weekly magazine, *Al Mussawar*, who also represents the magazines *Al Itnein*, *L'Image*, and *Parade*—all published by the El Hilal Publishing House.

This week-end the party plans to visit such points of interest as the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Arlington National Cemetery, the Library of Congress, the Supreme Court Building, and Mount Vernon.

Appointments have been arranged for them to meet J. Edgar Hoover, Chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Joseph Mack, Deputy Director of Field Operations, Department of Commerce; Vice Admiral Richard L. Connolly, Deputy Chief Naval Operations for Administration; and other high Government officials. They have expressed a desire to visit the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee and meet members of Congress who have taken an active interest in Near Eastern affairs. They also hope to attend a presidential press conference and a press conference for Secretary of War Patterson, and to meet Senators James M. Mead and Claude Pepper and Representative Karl Mundt.

While in Washington, the visitors will be guests of honor at receptions and teas given for them by the Egyptian Legation and American friends.

The journalists have inspected newspaper plants, publishing houses, and radio studios in New York City. They have observed American farming methods in several sections of the country, expressing particular interest in irrigation and land-reclamation projects and in cotton growing and textile development. They have been impressed by Detroit's automotive industry, West Coast shipyards and aircraft plants, and the Hollywood film studios.

Several groups of European journalists have recently completed tours of the United States, observing America's scientific, economic, and cultural achievements as well as the handling of reconversion and demobilization problems.

The Egyptian journalists plan to spend six days in Washington before returning to New York prior to embarking on their trip home.

Mail and Gift Parcel Services Resumed With Korea

[Released to the press July 11]

Effective on July 4, restricted mail and gift parcel services were resumed with Korea. The service will include letters, post cards, and printed matter, as well as ordinary (unregistered and uninsured) gift parcels.

Mail addressed for delivery in Korea may be in any of the following languages: Korean, English, Russian, French, Spanish, Chinese, or Japanese. Mail should bear the name of the addressee, street, district, town, and province in Korea. The address should be shown also in Korean characters, if known. Registration, air mail, money order and special delivery services are not available at this time.

The gift parcel service will be subject to the following restrictions:

Parcels may not exceed 11 pounds in weight.

Only one parcel per week may be sent by or

on behalf of the same sender to or for the same addressee.

Contents of parcels will be limited to essential relief items, such as non-perishable foods, clothing, soap, and mailable medicines.

The parcels and relative customs declaration must be conspicuously marked "Gift Parcel" by the senders who must itemize the contents and value on the customs declaration.

Parcels which are undeliverable will not be returned to senders, but will be turned over to authorized Korean relief agencies.

Parcels should bear the name of the addressee, street, district, town, and province in Korea. The address should be shown also in Korean characters, if known.

The export control regulations of the Office of International Trade are applicable for parcels for delivery in Korea.

Aviation Agreements

The following action has been taken on the Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation, the International Air Services Transit Agreement, and the Convention on International Civil Aviation formulated at the International Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago on December 7, 1944:

Mexico

The Ambassador of Mexico deposited with the Department of State on June 25 the Mexican instrument of ratification of the Convention and the acceptance of the Transit Agreement.

Argentina

The Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Argentina informed the Secretary of State by a note received in the Department of State on June 4 that the Government of Argentina accepts the Interim and Transit Agreements and adheres to the Convention.

Bolivia

The Ambassador of Bolivia informed the Secretary of State by a note received in the Department of State on May 17 that the Bolivian Government "have accepted the Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation, and the same has been put in force provisionally until it is approved by Congress."

New Zealand

The Minister of New Zealand informed the Secretary of State by a note dated April 29 that the reservation made by the New Zealand Government in accepting the Interim Agreement is withdrawn with respect to Denmark. The reservation was: "the New Zealand Government does not regard Denmark or Thailand as being parties to the Agreements mentioned (Interim and Transit) and does not regard itself as being in treaty relation with either of those countries with reference to these Agreements."

Treaty Obligations and Philippine Independence

REPLY OF BELGIAN GOVERNMENT TO U.S. NOTE ¹

AMBASSADE DE BELGIQUE,
Washington, July 11th, 1946.

SIR:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of May 4th, by which you kindly advised me that the Government of the United States of America considers that provision for a transitional period for dealing with the special tariff position which the Philippines products have occupied for many years in the United States, is an essential accompaniment to Philippine independence.

Accordingly, under the Philippine Trade Act approved April 30, 1946, goods the growth, produce or manufacture of the Philippines, will enter the United States free of duty until 1954, after which they will be subject to gradually and regularly increasing rates of duty or decreasing duty-free quotas until 1974 when general rates will be-

come applicable and all preferences will be completely eliminated.

Upon instructions received from my Government, I am pleased to advise you that, on behalf of the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union, they agree that the most-favoured-national provisions of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union, signed February 27, 1935, shall not be understood to require during the above mentioned period, the extension to the Economic Union of advantages accorded by the United States of America to the Philippines.

Accept [etc.]

SILVERCRUYS
The Belgian Ambassador

The Honorable DEAN ACHESON
Acting Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

Visit of Brazilian Judge

João Del Nero, judge of the Juvenile Court of Igarapava, São Paulo, Brazil, is in the United States at the invitation of the Department of State. He will visit juvenile courts and confer with colleagues in the field of juvenile delinquency.

His chief interests are juvenile delinquency and social problems. He has worked closely with the Y.M.C.A., which in 1938 invited him to visit Buenos Aires and Montevideo.

While in the United States he hopes to visit some of the penitentiaries and will write of his experiences to the *State of São Paulo*, newspaper in São Paulo.

During his three months in the United States, Dr. Del Nero plans to visit New York City, Boston, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Chicago, Omaha (Boys Town), Denver, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, in addition to Washington.

The Congress

Investigation of Exports of Cotton Cloth and Other Cotton Products: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, United States Senate, Seventy-ninth Congress, second session, on S. Res. 221, a resolution authorizing an investigation of exports of cotton cloth and other cotton products. February 26, 27, 28, March 1, 25, and 26, 1946. iii, 350 pp.

Foreign War Damage Claims: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Seventy-ninth Congress, second session, on S. Res. 1322, a bill to amend the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, and for other purposes. April 17, 1946. iii, 67 pp. [Department of State, pp. 4-5, 62-65.]

To Permit the Shipment of Relief Supplies: Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Seventy-ninth Congress, second session, on S. 2101, a bill to amend the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, to permit the shipment of relief supplies. April 25 and 26, 1946. iii, 99 pp.

¹ U.S. note is similar to note sent to Bolivian Government as printed in Bulletin of June 16, 1946, p. 1049.

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